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Abstract
We discuss a quantum key distribution scheme in which small phase and
amplitude modulations of quantum limited, CW light beams carry the key
information. We identify universal constraints on the level of shared informa-
tion between the intended receiver (Bob) and any eavesdropper (Eve) and use
this to make a general evaluation of the security and efficiency of the scheme.
INTRODUCTION
The distribution of random number keys for cryptographic purposes can be made secure
by using the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics to ensure that any interception
of the key information can be detected. This was first discussed for discrete systems in Refs.
[1–3]. Experimental demonstrations have been carried out using low photon number, optical
sources [4,5].
The basic mechanism used in quantum cryptographic schemes is the fact that the act
of measurement in quantum mechanics inevitably disturbs the system. This measurement
back-action exists for both discrete and continuous quantum mechanical variables. Thus it is
natural to ask if quantum cryptographic schemes based on continuous variables are possible.
There are a number of practical disadvantages with discrete quantum cryptographic schemes,
mainly associated with the lack of true single photon sources. Also it is of fundamental
interest to quantum information research to investigate links between discrete variable, single
photon phenomena and continuous variable, multi-photon effects. This has motivated a
consideration of quantum cryptographic schemes using multi-photon light modes [6–13].
Most of these schemes use squeezed light [14] in their protocols, either by producing
entanglement from the squeezing [10,8,9] or using the squeezing directly [7,11]. In contrast
to these, one scheme discussed in Ref. [6] is based on a coherent state. The signals from
which the key material is obtained are encoded in various ways in the different schemes.
The question of optimum protocols and eavesdropper strategies has been studied in detail
for the single quanta case [15], leading to general proofs of security for discrete systems
[16,17]. A general proof of the optimum eavesdropper strategy for a simple continuous
variable scheme was presented in Ref. [10]. A general proof of absolute security for a more
sophisticated scheme was presented in Ref. [11].
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In this chapter we will analyse in some detail quantum key distribution protocols based
on the optical coherent state and squeezed state schemes introduced in Refs. [6,10]. Our
emphasis will be on specific implementations that Alice and Bob might use rather than
general limits. The particular implementations have been chosen mostly for their simplicity
rather than their optimality. Eve on the other hand is always assumed to be employing
the optimum eavesdropping strategies allowed by quantum physics [18]. We estimate the
efficiency of the two schemes and hence secure key transmission rates under conditions of
negligible and non-negligible losses.
In Section I we review the encoding of information on light with small amplitude and
phase modulations and introduce a particular encoding scheme. In Section II we find the
minimum disturbance that an optimum eavesdropping scheme will introduce. The coherent
state cryptographic scheme is introduced in Section III and the minimum error rates that
an optimum Eve will introduce are calculated. In Section IV the concepts of mutual infor-
mation, data reconciliation and privacy amplification are introduced and specific examples
are applied to the coherent state scheme. The security and efficiency of the scheme are eval-
uated. The squeezed state cryptographic scheme is introduced, analysed and evaluated in
Section V. In section VI we discuss a physical implementation of the optimal eavesdropper
strategy and we conclude in Section VII.
I. ENCODING INFORMATION WITH SMALL AMPLITUDE AND PHASE
MODULATIONS
One way of encoding information on a light beam is by imposing small modulations of
the phase or amplitude of the beam at some radio frequency (rf) with respect to the main
optical frequency. We suppose that these signals are imposed at an rf sufficiently large that
technical noise can be ignored and so our measurement precision is limited only by quantum
noise. Typically frequencies in excess of about a MHz will suffice. That quantum mechanics
must impose limits in this situation is because the amplitude and and phase quadrature
amplitudes of the beam are the analogues of position and momentum variables. Hence they
are continuous, non-commuting variables that exhibit uncertainty relations.
We can represent our light field via
aˆ(t) = α + δaˆ(t) + δs(t) (1)
where aˆ is a bosonic annihilation operator which we have decomposed into a steady state
part, the coherent amplitude, α, treated classically, and two time varying parts: the quantum
fluctuations, modelled by the operator δaˆ(t); and the classical modulation, modelled by
δs(t). If we take the phase of α real then the amplitude fluctuations, Xˆ+, and the phase
fluctuations, Xˆ−, are given by
Xˆ+ = δaˆ(t)† + δs(t)∗ + δaˆ(t) + δs(t)
Xˆ− = i(δaˆ(t)† + δs(t)∗ − δaˆ(t)− δs(t)) (2)
Homodyne detection using a local oscillator with a coherent amplitude much larger than
that of the signal beam can be used to measure the fluctuations. Spectral analysis then
extracts the fluctuation power at a particular rf, ω, such that
2
V +(ω) =< |X˜+|2 >= V +n + V +s (3)
and
V −(ω) =< |X˜−|2 >= V −n + V −s (4)
where V +n (V
−
n ) is the amplitude (phase) quantum noise power whilst V
+
s (V
−
s ) is the am-
plitude (phase) signal power. The tilde indicates a Fourier transform.
The amount of information that can be carried on a Gaussian, additive noise, communi-
cation channel, such as we will consider here, depends on the signal to noise [19]. For a fixed
bandwidth, any reduction in the signal to noise will inevitably lead to increased errors in the
transmission. In our cryptographic scheme signals will be encoded on both quadratures but
read out from only one, randomly chosen. This will force any eavesdroppers to monitor both
the amplitude and phase quadratures simultaneously. For these non-commuting observables
the information that can be obtained in this way is strictly limited by the generalized un-
certainty principle for simultaneous measurements [20,21]. We will discuss this principle in
detail in the next section. Here let us consider a simple example. Suppose we try to observe
both quadratures by dividing the beam in two at a 50:50 beamsplitter and detecting the
amplitude quadrature of one beam and the phase quadrature of the other. Originally the
signal to noises are given by
(S/N)± =
V ±s
V ±n
(5)
However the signal to noises detected after the beamsplitter are
(S/N)±sim = (
V ±n
V ±n + V
±
m
)S/N± = T±S/N± (6)
where we define T+ (T−), the amplitude (phase) signal transfer coefficient, as the ratio
of signal to noise out to signal to noise in. The quantum noise which is inevitably added
through the empty beamsplitter port is V ±m . The spectral powers are normalized to the
quantum noise limit (QNL) such that a coherent beam has V ±n = 1. Normally the partition
noise will also be at this limit (V ±m = 1). For a classical light field, i.e. where V
±
n >> 1 the
penalty will be negligible. However for a coherent beam a halving of the signal to noise for
both quadratures is unavoidable.
To continue our analysis of this example let us consider the specific encoding scheme
of binary pulse code modulation. The data is encoded as a train of pulses, a pulse on
representing a “1”, a pulse off representing a “0”. For bandwidth limited transmission the
bit error rate or error probability (B) and the signal to noise (S/N) are related by [22]
B = 1
2
erfc
1
2
√
1
2
S/N (7)
Now suppose our signal to noise is initially 13 dB. From Eq.7 direct detection of a single
quadrature will retrieve its pulse train with a bit error rate of 1%. If the beam is in a
coherent state and we simultaneously detect both quadratures then Eq.6 tells us that the
signal to noise is halved. Eq.7 then predicts the error rate will rise to 5%.
3
II. OPTIMUM EAVESDROPPER STRATEGY
In this section we will use the generalized uncertainty principle to identify the minimum
disturbance allowed by quantum mechanics to the information Bob receives given a particu-
lar level of interception by Eve. The idea is shown schematically in Fig.1. A single quantum
limited beam is sent from Alice to Bob. Eve makes some unspecified interception of the
beam enroute. Bob and Eve obtain some measurement results. We will show that quantum
mechanics sets unambiguous limits on the level of quantum noise that must appear in Bob
and Eve’s results. In the following sections we will apply these results to specific quantum
cryptographic systems.
A more general statement of the generalized uncertainty principle [21] requires that for
any simultaneous measurements of conjugate quadrature amplitudes
V +MV
−
M ≥ 1 (8)
where V ±M are the measurement penalties for the amplitude (+) and phase (−) quadratures,
normalized to the amplification gain between the system observables and the measuring ap-
paratus. For example suppose an attempt to measure the amplitude quadrature variance of
a system V +k returned the result G1V
+
k +G2V
+
m where V
+
m represents noise. Then we would
have V +M = (G2/G1)V
+
m . Eq.6 follows directly from Eq.8 for ideal simultaneous measure-
ments. Let us investigate what general restrictions this places on the information that Eve
can intercept and the subsequent corruption of Bob’s signal. Firstly Eve’s measurements
will inevitably carry measurement penalties V ±E constrained by
V +E V
−
E ≥ 1 (9)
Now suppose Bob makes an ideal (no noise added) amplitude measurement on the beam
he receives. In order to satisfy Eq.8 it must be true that the noise penalty carried on the
amplitude quadrature of this beam V +B due to Eve’s intervention, is sufficiently large such
that
V +B V
−
E ≥ 1 (10)
Similarly, Bob can also choose to make ideal measurements of the phase quadrature so we
must also have
V +E V
−
B ≥ 1 (11)
Eqs.9,10,11 set strict quantum mechanical limits on the minimum disturbance Eve can cause
to Bob’s information given a particular maximum quality of the information she receives.
This applies regardless of the method she uses to eavesdrop. Note that quantum memory
does not negate the above results provided we insist that Alice and Bob do not exchange
any potentially revealing classical information until Alice is sure that Bob has received and
measured her signals.
These relations could form the basis of a security analysis of any continuous variable
quantum cryptographic scheme in which a single quantum beam is exchanged. However
the ramifications of a particular level of disturbance will vary for different schemes. In the
following section we will analyse the security of a very simple scheme based on the exchange
of a beam in a coherent state.
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III. COHERENT STATE QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
Consider the set up depicted in Fig.2. A possible protocol is as follows. Alice generates
two independent random strings of numbers and encodes one on the phase quadrature, and
the other on the amplitude quadrature of a bright coherent beam. The amplitude and phase
signals are imposed at the same frequency with equal power. Bob uses homodyne detection
to detect either the amplitude or phase quadrature of the beam when he receives it. He
swaps randomly which quadrature he detects. On a public line Bob then tells Alice at
which quadrature he was looking, at any particular time. They pick some subset of Bob’s
data to be the test and the rest to be the key. For example, they may pick the amplitude
quadrature as the test signal. They would then compare results for the times that Bob
was looking at the amplitude quadrature. If Bob’s results agreed with what Alice sent, to
within some acceptable error rate, they would consider the transmission secure. They would
then use the undisclosed phase quadrature signals, sent whilst Bob was observing the phase
quadrature, to create their key. By randomly swapping which quadrature is key and which
is test throughout the data comparison an increased error rate on either quadrature will
immediately be obvious.
Before making a general analysis of security let us first consider some specific strategies
an eavesdropper could adopt. Eve could guess which quadrature Bob is going to measure
and measure it herself. She could then reproduce the digital signal of that quadrature and
impress it on another coherent beam which she would send on to Bob. She would learn
nothing about the other quadrature through her measurement and would have to guess her
own random string of numbers to place on it. When Eve guesses the right quadrature to
measure Bob and Alice will be none the wiser, however, on average 50% of the time Eve
will guess wrong. Then Bob will receive a random string from Eve unrelated to the one
sent by Alice. These will agree only 50% of the time. Thus Bob and Alice would see a
25% bit error rate in the test transmission if Eve was using this strategy. This is analogous
to the result for single quanta schemes in which this type of strategy is the most readily
available. Another single measurement strategy Eve could use is to do homodyne detection
at a quadrature angle half-way between phase and amplitude. This fails because the signals
become mixed. Thus Eve can tell when both signals are 0 or both are 1 but she cannot tell
the difference between 1,0 and 0,1. This again leads to a 25% bit error rate.
However, for bright beams it is possible to make simultaneous measurements of the
quadratures, with the caveat that there will be some loss of information. So a second
strategy that Eve could follow would be to split the beam in half, measure both quadratures
and impose the information obtained on the respective quadratures of another coherent beam
which she sends to Bob. How well will this strategy work? We performed this calculation
at the end of section I using Eq.7. The halving of signal to noise imposed by the 50:50
beamsplitter means the information Eve intercepts and subsequently passes on to Bob will
have an error probability of 5% (for the particular case of bandwidth limited binary pulse
code modulation). This is clearly a superior strategy and would be less easily detected.
Further more Eve could adopt a third strategy of only intercepting a small amount of the
beam and doing simultaneous detection on it. For example, by intercepting 16% of the
beam, Eve could gain information about both quadratures with an error rate of 25% whilst
Bob and Alice would observe only a small increase of their error rate to 1.7%. In other
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words Eve could obtain about the same amount of information about the key that she could
obtain using the “guessing” strategy, whilst being more difficult to detect.
Now let us analyze this coherent state scheme using Eqs.9,10,11. We choose to couch
our evaluation in terms of bit error rates because they represent an unambiguous, directly
observable measure of the extent to which Eve can intercept information and the resulting
corruption of Bob’s information. This connection will be developed in Section IV. Depending
on the particular technique Eve uses Bob and Alice may be able to gain additional evidence
for Eve’s presence by comparing the absolute noise levels of the sent and received signals.
This can only increase the security of the system. By considering a general limit on error
rates we can find a minimum guaranteed security against eavesdropping regardless of the
technique Eve employs.
The signal transfer coefficients for Bob and Eve will be given by
T+E =
(S/N)+eve
(S/N)+in
=
V +in
V +in + V
+
E
T−E =
(S/N)−eve
(S/N)−in
=
V −in
V −in + V
−
E
T+B =
(S/N)+bob
(S/N)+in
=
V +in
V +in + V
+
B
T−B =
(S/N)−bob
(S/N)−in
=
V −in
V −in + V
−
B
(12)
Substituting Eqs.12 into Eqs.9,10,11 and using the fact that V ±in = 1 we find
T+E + T
−
E ≤ 1
T+E + T
−
B ≤ 1
T+B + T
−
E ≤ 1 (13)
Eqs.13 clearly show that any attempt by Eve to get a good signal to noise on one quadrature
(e.g. T+E → 1) results not only in a poor signal to noise in her information of the other
quadrature (e.g. T−E → 0) but also a poor signal to noise for Bob on that quadrature (e.g.
T−B → 0), making her presence obvious. This is the general limit of the guessing strategy
presented in the last section and leads to the same error rates.
Because of the symmetry of Bob’s readout technique Eve’s best approach is a symmetric
attack on both quadratures. Eqs.13 then reduces to two equations
2T±E ≤ 1
T±E + T
±
B ≤ 1 (14)
If Eve extracts her maximum allowable signal to noise transfer, T±E = 0.5, then ideally
Bob suffers the same penalty T±B = 0.5. This is the general limit of the second strategy of
the previous section. The same reduction in Bob’s signal to noise occurs as in the specific
implementation thus this implementation can be identified as an optimum eavesdropper
strategy for obtaining maximum simultaneous information about both quadratures.
Eve’s best strategy is to intercept only as much information as she can without being
detected. The system will be secure if that level of information can be made negligible.
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Suppose, as in the last section, Eve only intercepts a signal transfer of T±E = .08. From Eq.14
this means Bob can receive at most a signal transfer of T±B = .92. This is greater than the
result for the specific implementation discussed in the last section, thus that implementation
is not an optimum eavesdropper strategy. Using the optimum eavesdropper strategy the
error rates for the specific encoding scheme discussed in the last section will be: if Eve
intercepts information with an error probability of 25%, then the minimum error rate in
Bob’s information will be 1.4%.
In Fig.3 we represent the general situation by plotting the minimum error rate Bob and
Alice can observe against the error rate in Eve’s intercepted information. An error rate of
50% (i.e. completely random) represents no information about the data. Two traces are
shown, representing different initial signal to noises in Alice’s data. This graph shows that
in principle any incursion by Eve will result in some increase in Bob and Alice’s error rate.
However one could also argue that any finite resolution in Bob and Alice’s determination of
their error rate will allow Eve to do better than the random result. In order to assess whether
this system can be made secure we need to introduce the concepts of mutual information
and privacy amplification.
IV. MUTUAL INFORMATION AND PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
The mutual information of party 1 and party 2 is the information overlap between the
data possessed by the two parties. The binary entropy of party 1’s data, x, is given by
H(x) = −pxlog2px − (1− px)log2(1− px) (15)
where px and 1 − px are the probabilities of the two outcomes. Similarly party 2’s data, y,
has binary entropy
H(y) = −pylog2py − (1− py)log2(1− py) (16)
The joint entropy of the two data strings is then given by
H(x, y) = −Σx,ypx,ylog2px,y (17)
with px,y the joint probabilities. The mutual information is defined
H(x : y) = H(x) +H(y)−H(x, y) (18)
If the two data strings x and y are random then H(x) = H(y) = 1. Suppose the error
probability between the data strings is B, then the joint probabilities are given by p0,0 =
p1,1 = 1− B and p0,1 = p1,0 = B. Thus we find
H(x : y) = 1 + Blog2B + (1− B)log2(1− B) (19)
Suppose A is Alice’s data string, B is Bob’s data string and E is Eve’s data string. Maurer
has shown [23] that provided H(A : B) > H(A : E) then it is in principle possible for Alice
and Bob to extract a secret key from the data. Eve’s mutual information with this secret
key can be made arbitrarily small. From Eq.19 we see that this condition will be satisfied
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provided Bob’s error rate is less than Eve’s. From Fig.3 we see that provided Alice and Bob’s
error rate does not exceed 5% for case (a) or 12% for case (b) then secret key generation is
in principle possible. In the following we will look at a simple specific example of a secret
key generation protocol and evaluate its efficiency.
Because of the transmission errors (and possibly the actions of Eve) Alice and Bob won’t
share the same data string. However techniques exist for data reconciliation which allow
Alice and Bob to select with high probability a subset of their data which is error free, whilst
giving Eve minimal extra knowledge. As a simple example Alice and Bob could perform
a parity check on randomly chosen pairs of bits. If the error rate between Bob and Alice
is low then the probability of both bits being wrong is very low. Thus discarding all pairs
which fail the parity check will lead to a big reduction in errors in the shared data whilst
not revealing the values of the individual bits to Eve. A series of parity checks will lead with
high probability to zero errors. Eve can also remove the pairs that Bob removes and in a
worse case scenario may remove up to the same number of errors as Bob. But if Eve initially
had significantly more errors than Bob then she will still have significant errors after the
reconciliation, whilst Bob and Alice will have virtually none. The data string length will be
reduced by a factor of approximately 1− 2BB, where BB is Bob’s error probability.
In order to reduce Eve’s mutual information to a negligible amount the technique of
privacy amplification is employed [24]. This involves the random hashing or block coding of
the reconciled key into a shorter key. As a simple example Alice and Bob could randomly
pick data strings of length n from the reconciled key and form a new key from the sum,
modulo 2, of each n unit block. It is important that the privacy amplification is “orthogonal”
to the reconciliation protocol. That is none of the pairs used in the parity checks should
appear together in the privacy amplification blocks. The length of the new key will be
reduced by a factor of 1/n. The error probability in the new key will be given by
Bpa = Σn/2k=0
n!
(2k)!(n− 2k)!(1− B)
n−2kB2k (20)
where B is the error probability of the original string. If B ≈ 0, as for Bob and Alice, then
this process introduces virtually no errors. But when Eve copies this process her errors will
be “amplified”, hopefully to the point where her mutual information is negligible. Some
caution is required in evaluating Eve’s mutual information now. Just as Bob and Alice were
able to select a sub-set of results they knew were correct in the reconciliation process, so
Eve can also obtain a (smaller) subset of results for which she has greater confidence. We
make the worst case assumption that after privacy amplification Eve is left with some small
probability, pr, of possessing certain bits that she knows are right, and a large probability,
1− pr, of possessing bits which are completely random. In such a situation it is appropriate
to set Eve’s mutual information as
H(A : E) = pr = 1− 2Bpae (21)
where Bpae is Eve’s average error probability, as given by Eq.20.
Let us now apply these techniques to the continuous variable protocol of the previous
section to evaluate its security. After Bob has received all the data from Alice he tells her
at which quadrature he was looking at any particular time and Alice sorts out her sent data
accordingly. They then compare a randomly chosen sub-section of their data (approximately
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half) and determine the error rate. For the example in the previous section they expect a
base error rate of 1%. Let them reject the data and start again if they detect an error rate
of ≥ 2%. To be cautious, let us assume that in fact the error rate could have been as high as
2.5%. For sufficiently long data strings there will be negligible probability of this error rate
being exceeded in the undisclosed data [25]. From Fig.3 (trace (a)) we can read off that Eve’s
error rate must be ≥10.5%. Applying our simple information reconciliation protocol Bob
and Alice’s error probability can be reduced to virtually zero whilst Eve’s error rate is ≥8%.
We now apply privacy amplification. Fig.4 (trace (a)) shows Eve’s mutual information as a
function of the block length, n. Clearly Eve’s mutual information is decreasing exponentially
as a function of block length. This is the signature of a secure system. A linear expenditure
of resources results in an exponentially small mutual information with Eve. In fact Bob and
Alice can do better by using a smaller initial signal strength. If Alice reduces the size of the
signal she sends to about half that of the previous example (now with a signal to noise of
about 10dB) Bob’s base error rate will rise to 5%. They set their error threshold at 6%. To
be cautious we assume the error rate could be as high as 6.5%. From Fig.3 (trace (b)) we
find that Eve’s error rate must be ≥26%. After reconciliation Eve’s error rate must still be
≥19.5%. Fig.4 (trace(b)) plots Eve’s mutual information as a function of the block length
for this situation showing a more rapid decay. This is approximately the optimum signal
strength. However Alice and Bob may also seek to improve the efficiency of the system by
employing more sophisticated reconciliation and privacy amplification protocols.
To this point we have assumed that the transmission line between Alice and Bob is
lossless. In practice this will not be true. If we make no constraints on Eve’s technical
abilities then we must assume that all lost light has fallen into her hands [26]. Thus we must
calculate Eve’s potential mutual information from Bob’s error rate as if there was no loss,
but we must set our error threshold quite high because the losses will drive up Bob’s errors.
It is clear that loss of 50% or more can not be tolerated because Eve’s and Bob’s error rates
become equal at this point. Indeed as losses approach 50% the expenditure of resources by
Bob and Alice needed to reconcile and privacy amplify will increase rapidly.
Let us estimate by what factor the length of the final secure key would be reduced over
the length of the original string sent by Alice in a system with 25% loss. Consider an original
signal to noise of about 10dB, leading to a base error rate with 25% loss of 7.7%. Setting
as before our maximum error rate 1.5% above the base rate at 9.3% we can bound Eve’s
error rate at ≥16.3%. Bob and Alice sacrifice half their data in this step. Reconciliation will
reduce Bob and Alice’s data string by a factor of 0.81 and leave Eve with an error rate ≥7%.
If we require that Eve’s mutual information be ≤0.001 for the transmission to be considered
secure then we find a block length of n = 46 is required in the privacy amplification step.
Thus the secure key will be reduced by a factor of 0.5 × 0.81 × 0.02 = 0.01. (A similar
estimate for the optimum no loss case gives a reduction factor of 0.025) Data transmission
via rf signals is a mature technology and bit transmission rates of 100 MHz would seem quite
reasonable. Thus secure key transmission rates of a a MHz would seem practical under these
conditions. This is about three orders of magnitude better than what is presently achievable
with single photon schemes. On the other hand it should be noted that single quanta schemes
can tolerate much higher losses [4].
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V. SQUEEZED STATE QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
The preceding discussion has shown that a cryptographic scheme based on coherent light
can produce secure keys with an efficiency of about 1/40→ 1/100. We now consider whether
squeezed light can offer improved efficiency.
The set-up is shown in Fig.5. Once again Alice encodes her number strings digitally,
but now she impresses them on the amplitude quadratures of two, phase locked, amplitude
squeezed beams, a and b, one on each. A pi/2 phase shift is imposed on beam b and then
they are mixed on a 50:50 beamsplitter. The resulting output modes, c and d, are given by
c =
√
1
2
(a+ ib)
d =
√
1
2
(a− ib) (22)
These beams are now in an entangled state which will exhibit Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen
(EPR) type correlations [27,29]. Negligible information about the signals can be extracted
from the beams individually because the large fluctuations of the anti-squeezed quadratures
are now mixed with the signal carrying squeezed quadratures. One of the beams, say c,
is transmitted to Bob. The other beam, d, Alice retains and uses homodyne detection to
measure either its amplitude or phase fluctuations, with respect to a local oscillator in phase
with the original beams a and b. She randomly swaps which quadrature she measures, and
stores the results. Bob, upon receiving beam c, also randomly chooses to measure either its
amplitude or phase quadrature and stores his results. After the transmission is complete
Alice sends the results of her measurements on beam d to Bob on an open channel. About
half the time Alice will have measured a different quadrature to Bob in a particular time
window. Bob discards these results. The rest of the data corresponds to times when they
both measured the same quadratures. If they both measured the amplitude quadratures of
each beam Bob adds them together, in which case he can obtain the power spectrum
V + = < |(c˜† + c˜) + (d˜† + d˜)|2 >
= Vs,a + V
+
n,a (23)
where the tilde indicate Fourier transforms. Thus he obtains the data string impressed on
beam a, Vs,a, imposed on the sub-QNL noise floor of beam a, V
+
n,a. Alternatively if they
both measured the phase quadratures of each beam, Bob subtracts them, in which case he
can obtain the power spectrum
V − = < |(c˜† − c˜)− (d˜† − d˜)|2 >
= Vs,b + V
+
n,b (24)
i.e. he obtains the data string impressed on beam b, Vs,b, imposed on the sub-QNL noise
floor of beam b, V +n,b. Thus the signals lie on conjugate quadratures but both have sub-QNL
noise floors. This is the hallmark of the EPR correlation [30]. As for the coherent state case
Alice and Bob now compare some sub-set of their shared data and check for errors. If the
error rate is sufficiently low they deem their transmission secure and use reconciliation and
privacy amplification on the undisclosed sub-set of their data to produce a secure key.
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Consider now eavesdropper strategies. Eve must intercept beam c if she is to extract any
useful information about the signals from the classical channel (containing Alice’s measure-
ments of beam d) sent later. She can adopt the guessing strategy by detecting a particular
quadrature of beam c and then using a similar apparatus to Alice’s to re-send the beam and
a corresponding classical channel later. As before she will only guess correctly what Bob will
measure half the time thus introducing a BER of 25%. Instead she may try simultaneous
detection of both quadratures of beam c. As in the coherent case the noise she introduces
into her own measurement (V ±E ) and that she introduces into Bob’s (V
±
B ) are in general
limited according to Eqs.9,10 and 11. However now the consequences of these noise limits
on the signal to noise transfers that Eve and Bob can obtain behave quite differently because
the signals they are trying to extract lie on sub-QNL backgrounds. The maximum signal
transfer coefficients that Eve can extract are given by
T+E =
(V +E + 2V
−
n,b)V
+
n,a
2V +n,aV
−
n,b + V
+
E (V
+
n,a + V
−
n,b)
T−E =
(V −E + 2V
−
n,a)V
+
n,b
2V +n,bV
−
n,a + V
−
E (V
+
n,b + V
−
n,a)
(25)
Similarly Bob’s are
T+B =
(V +B + 2V
−
n,b)V
+
n,a
2V +n,aV
−
n,b + V
+
B (V
+
n,a + V
−
n,b)
T−B =
(V −B + 2V
−
n,a)V
+
n,b
2V +n,bV
−
n,a + V
−
B (V
+
n,b + V
−
n,a)
(26)
To achieve maximum security we require that the anti-squeezed quadratures of the beams
have large excess noise. This could easily be arranged experimentally. The maximum signal
transfer coefficients (Eq.25 and Eq.26) then reduce to
T+E =
V +n,a
V +n,a + 0.5V
+
E
T−E =
V +n,b
V +n,b + 0.5V
−
E
(27)
and similarly Bob’s are
T+B =
V +n,a
V +n,a + 0.5V
+
B
T−B =
V +n,b
V +n,b + 0.5V
−
B
(28)
For the squeezed noise floors the same (V +n,a = V
+
n,b = Vn) we find the signal transfers are
restricted via
4V 2n (
1
T+E
− 1)( 1
T−E
− 1) ≥ 1 (29)
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4V 2n (
1
T+E
− 1)( 1
T−B
− 1) ≥ 1 (30)
4V 2n (
1
T+B
− 1)( 1
T−E
− 1) ≥ 1 (31)
It is straightforward to show that a symmetric attack on both quadratures is Eve’s best
strategy as it leads to a minimum disturbance in both her and Bob’s measurements. Using
this symmetry to simplify Eq.29 leads to the following general restriction on the signal
transfer Eve can obtain:
T±E ≤
2Vn
2Vn + 1
(32)
Once the squeezing exceeds 3 dB (Vn = 0.5) the signal to noise that Eve can obtain simul-
taneously is reduced below that for the coherent state scheme. In the limit of very strong
squeezing (Vn → 0) Eve can extract virtually no information simultaneously. Similarly Bob’s
signal transfer is restricted according to:
T±E T
±
B
(1− T±E )(1− T±B )
≤ 4Vn (33)
If squeezing is strong then almost any level of interception by Eve will result in very poor
signal transfer to Bob. In Fig.6 we show plots of error rates of Bob versus minimum error
rates of Eve for various levels of squeezing. In comparison with the coherent scheme (Fig.3) it
can be seen that larger disturbances are caused in Bob’s information for the same quality of
Eve’s interception. As a numerical example consider the specific encoding scheme of section
I and suppose the squeezing is 10 dB (Vn = 0.1). Assuming no loss and using the same
assumptions as those used to evaluate the coherent scheme in the last section we find that a
secure key of length 0.07 times the original data string length can be generated. That is an
efficiency of about 1/14, to be compared to the coherent case of 1/40, a clear improvement.
Unfortunately this high sensitivity to interception by Eve also results in a high sensitivity
to loss. For the case above the break even point between Bob and Eve’s errors is for a loss of
only 16%. The squeezing system can only be used to advantage if the loss in the transmission
is much less than this value. Thus we find that although in principle squeezing improves
the efficiency of the scheme, in practice the constraints on the quality of the transmission
become quite critical.
VI. TELEPORTATION AS THE OPTIMUM EAVESDROPPER STRATEGY
It is interesting to consider what physical techniques Eve could use to realize the optimal
attack strategy we have assumed her capable of throughout this discussion. Firstly she
would need to replace the lossy transmission line that Bob and Alice are using with her own
transmission line of negligible loss. Given that Bob and Alice will presumably employ the
most efficient transmission line they can obtain, Eve’s job is not trivial. Secondly she must
extract information from the transmission with the least possible disturbance, such that the
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inequalities of Eqs.9,10 and 11 are saturated. In Ref. [10] it was shown that Eve can use
continuous variable teleportation [32,33,29] as such an optimum eavesdropper strategy. In
this section we will review that result.
Quantum teleportation uses shared entanglement to convert quantum information into
classical information and then back again (see Fig.6). In particular continuous variable
teleportation uses 2-mode squeezed light as its entanglement resource. In the limit of very
strong squeezing no information about the teleported system can be extracted from the
classical channel but a perfect reproduction of the quantum system can be retrieved. On the
other hand with lower levels of squeezing some information about the system can be obtained
from the the classical channel but at the expense of a less than perfect reproduction. We show
in the following that under particular operating conditions the disturbance in the teleported
state is precisely the minimum required by the generalized uncertainty principle, given the
quality of information that can be extracted from the classical channel. Teleportation thus
constitutes an optimum eavesdropper strategy.
Eve’s strategy would be to send the field she intercepts from Alice through a teleporter,
adjusted such that she can read some information out of the classical channel, but still
reconstruct the field sufficiently well such that Bob and Alice don’t see a large error rate.
The classical channel of a lossless continuous variable teleporter can be written [10,29]
Fc = K(fˆin + jˆ
†
1)
= K(fˆin +
√
Gvˆ†1 +
√
G− 1vˆ2) (34)
where fˆin is the annihilation operator of the input to the teleporter and jˆ1 =
√
Gvˆ1 +√
G− 1vˆ†2 is the annihilation operator for one of the entangled beams. The vˆi are the vac-
uum mode inputs to the squeezers, G is the parametric gain of the squeezers and K >> 1
is the measurement amplification factor. Being a classical channel simultaneous measure-
ments of both quadratures can be made without additional penalty thus immediately Eve’s
measurement penalty is
V ±E = 2G− 1 (35)
For no squeezing (G = 1) V ±E = 1, the minimum possible for simultaneous detection of both
quadratures (see Eq.9). For large squeezing (G >> 1) V ±E become very large and Eve can
obtain little information from the classical channel.
The output of the teleporter is given by
fˆout = λfˆin + jˆ
†
1 − jˆ2
= λfˆin + (λ
√
G−√G− 1)vˆ†1 + (
√
G− λ√G− 1)vˆ2 (36)
where λ is the gain of the teleporter and jˆ2 =
√
Gvˆ2+
√
G− 1vˆ†1 is the annihilation operator
for the other entangled beam. Thus Bob’s measurement penalty for ideal measurements of
either of the quadratures is
V ±B =
(λ
√
G−√G− 1)2 + (√G− λ√G− 1)2
λ2
(37)
If Eve operates the teleporter with gain [34]
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λopt =
1 + V 2sq
1− V 2sq
(38)
where Vsq = (
√
G−√G− 1)2, then Bob’s noise penalty is
V ±B (λopt) =
1
2G− 1 (39)
and so Eve causes the minimum allowable disturbance, i.e. V ±E V
±
B = 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have investigated continuous variable quantum cryptography as it
could be realized in optics by analysing the security and efficiency of specific implementations
of two systems based on coherent and squeezed state light respectively. An Eve employing
an optimal eavesdropper attack is assumed throughout. A possible optimal attack strategy
that Eve could employ is outlined.
We find that the coherent scheme can be made secure, but is not very efficient. None-
the-less, given the maturity of optical communication technology based on rf modulation,
this system may be competitive with discrete schemes in a local network scenario.
The squeezed state scheme can also be made secure and in principle is more efficient
than the coherent state system. However its greater sensitivity to losses could make it less
practical.
We have looked at simple protocols throughout this analysis. It could be expected that
more sophisticated encoding, reconciliation and privacy amplification techniques would lead
to significant improvements in performance.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Schematic of general set-up. Alice sends information encoded in the amplitude (V +A )
and phase (V −A ) spectra. Bob makes measurements of either the amplitude or phase quadrature.
Some additional noise is present on his measurements, V ±B . Eve does not know which quadrature
Bob will measure thus she needs to be able to extract information about both quadratures from
her intercepted material. This leads to strict bound on the allowed values of the additional noise
which must appear on her measurements (V ±E )
FIG. 2. Schematic of coherent light cryptographic set-up. AM is an amplitude modulator
whilst PM is a phase modulator.
FIG. 3. Minimum allowable error probabilities in the data of Bob and Eve are plotted for two
signal to noise levels of Alice’s beam. Trace (a) is for a signal to noise of 13dB whilst trace (b) is
for a signal to noise of 10dB.
FIG. 4. Decay of Eve mutual information as a function of the block length, n, in Alice and
Bob’s privacy amplification protocol is plotted for two signal to noise levels of Alice’s beam. Trace
(a) is for a signal to noise of 13dB whilst trace (b) is for a signal to noise of 10dB. The solid traces
are exponential fits.
FIG. 5. Schematic of squeezed light cryptographic set-up. Sqza and sqzb are phase locked
squeezed light sources. Rna and Rnb are independent random number sources. Bs and pbs are
non-polarizing and polarizing beamsplitters respectively. Half-wave plates to rotate the polariza-
tions are indicated by λ/2 and optical amplification by A. The pi/2 phase shift is also indicated.
HD stands for homodyne detection system.
FIG. 6. Minimum allowable error probabilities in the data of Bob and Eve are plotted for
various levels of squeezing.
FIG. 7. Schematic of teleportation being used as an optimum eavesdropper strategy.
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